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Foreword 
The UK’s current laws on drugs are both outdated and harmful. 
Each year, criminal gangs generate billions of pounds from the illegal drug trade1 – 
money which in turn funds organised crime2. And each year thousands of people 
receive convictions for drug possession3 which will harm their education and 
employment prospects for the rest of their lives.  
At the same time, the UK is spending billions fighting a losing battle on drug use, 
and countless police hours are spent targeting people carrying small amounts for 
personal use - hours which could be better used going after more serious criminals.  
Both the financial and human cost is vast. This desperately needs to change.  
It is often suggested that attempts to move away from total prohibition of drugs 
sends the message that these substances are harmless. To the contrary, I believe we 
need to regulate drugs precisely because of the harms they pose. Nothing is made 
safer when it is left in the hands of criminals. 
Liberal Democrats argue that we need an evidence based approach to drugs law, one 
which is based on independent and scientific advice, rather than fear and prejudice. 
We believe we should end the use of imprisonment for possession of drugs for 
personal use and that drug use should be primarily a health issue, not a criminal 
justice one. My Parliamentary colleagues and I have also argued that all recreational 
drug use should be decriminalised.  
I have also argued that we should go one step further and examine what a fully 
regulated market for cannabis could look like in the UK. We need to stop pretending 
that a total ban on cannabis can eliminate use. Decades of evidence show that, 
despite the best efforts of policy makers and law enforcers, this is not the case.   
It might be a young person experimenting, an adult relaxing or someone with an 
illness alleviating pain. In each case, an illicit market means they have no real idea 
what they are taking. What is more, by only being able to buy on the illegal market, 
                                                          
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drugs Report, 2010  
2 European Commission Press Release, EU to provide new funding to counter organised crime and drug trafficking, August 
2014, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-914_en.htm 
3 UK Drug Policy Commission, A Fresh Approach to Drugs, October 2012, available at: http://www.ukdpc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/a-fresh-approach-to-drugs-the-final-report-of-the-uk-drug-policy-commission.pdf 
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we leave them exposed to drug dealers who have every incentive to encourage them 
to try other more risky drugs.  
I believe we can better manage the harms associated with cannabis by regulating the 
quality and strength of products, investing in public health education and taking 
money away from criminals.  
My sincere thanks to all of the panel members for their time and expertise in 
producing this groundbreaking report. I have no doubt it will be an invaluable 
contribution to the ongoing debate about drug policy in the UK. I urge policy makers 
of all parties, and none, to take account of its recommendations and I hope this will 
be a significant step in moving the debate about our drug laws into the 21st century.  
 
Norman Lamb MP 
Liberal Democrat Health Spokesperson   
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Note from the Chair  
The Liberal Democrat party, having decided to further develop their policy on 
cannabis regulation, convened an independent panel to make recommendations on 
policy design. The panel, made up of leading experts in drug policy and law with a 
longstanding interest in issues related to cannabis, was specifically asked to make 
recommendations for how best to deliver a regulated cannabis market in the UK, 
taking into account established models in other jurisdictions, as well as wider 
experience with regulation of alcohol, tobacco and other drugs. The panel met for 
three half-day workshops in London between November 2015 and January 2016, 
with additional discussions and work on the draft recommendations taking place by 
email correspondence.  
Editorial control over this report and its recommendations rests solely with the panel 
members. The panel have expressed a desire to see the report usefully inform policy 
development more broadly and confirm that they would consider requests for advice 
on the topic of cannabis policy from any political party.   
Participation of members of the panel has been on a purely voluntary basis, except 
to cover appropriate travel costs in order to attend the meetings. We would like to 
thank Chatham House for hosting the panel meetings, George Murkin (from 
Transform) for editorial support, and Rosie Shimell (an employee of the Liberal 
Democrats) who acted as secretariat and meeting coordinator. 
Steve Rolles 
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Introduction  
The case for reform 
The growing debate around the legalisation and regulation of cannabis has been 
driven by an evidence-based critique of the drug’s prohibition. More recent moves 
from theoretical debate into policy and practice in multiple jurisdictions have given 
an added impetus to the push for reform. Whilst the arguments for cannabis 
regulation are well trodden, it is worth summarising them as a backdrop to the 
recommendations that follow:  
The criminalisation of people who use cannabis: 
 Has not been an effective deterrent to use   
 Is an unjust and disproportionate sanction for a consenting adult behaviour  
 Creates substantial hardship where a criminal record interferes with the ability to 
travel or find employment, housing, personal finance – the burden of which falls 
most heavily on already marginalised groups (in particular the poor, ethnic 
minorities and young people) 
 Is expensive to enforce, and creates a substantial burden across the criminal 
justice system 
 Alienates key populations, and creates obstacles to effective health education 
and treatment 
 
The prohibition on cannabis production and supply:  
 Creates opportunities for criminal entrepreneurs, fuelling a vast and socially 
corrosive criminal market, associated with violence, people trafficking and slavery, 
including of children  
 Ensures that people who use cannabis have little or no information about the 
potency of the product they are consuming 
 Ensures people who use cannabis buy from potentially risky illicit markets that 
put them in contact with dealers of other more harmful drugs  
 Has progressively tilted the market towards more risky products (with higher THC 
and lower CBD) that are more profitable to the criminal entrepreneurs who 
control the trade  
 Has led to the rapid expansion of markets for more risky synthetic cannabis 
analogues (e.g. ‘spice’)  
 
Ending the criminalisation of people who use cannabis, and responsibly regulating 
markets would:  
 End the unjust and iniquitous burden of mass criminalisation  
 Dramatically shrink the illegal cannabis market and related problems  
 Allow authorities to regulate cannabis products to make them safer, enable 
consumers to make more informed choices, create opportunities for targeted 
education and harm reduction, and other evidence based health interventions     
6                                                   A framework for a regulated market for cannabis in the UK 
 Incur substantial savings for the police and across the criminal justice system   
 Create opportunities for substantial tax revenue generation 
 
We acknowledge that there are well documented health risks associated with 
cannabis: particularly with heavy regular use, use amongst children, use by people 
with mental health vulnerabilities, and certain using behaviours including smoking 
with tobacco, driving under the influence of cannabis, and consumption during 
pregnancy. The argument for regulation is premised on the concept that such risks 
are more effectively managed and minimised in the context of a public health led 
response and responsibly regulated market, than a punitive criminal justice led 
response and unregulated criminal market.  
We also acknowledge the risks of a commercialised legal market leading to 
increased use and health harms but we argue that these can be reasonably 
anticipated and that a responsibly regulated market can mitigate against such risks.  
At the same time, responsible market regulation can reduce the harms caused by 
current cannabis policy and bring wider social benefits. This claim is increasingly 
supported by emerging evidence from cannabis regulation models around the world.      
Policy aims 
Before considering what an optimal cannabis regulatory model could look like, it is 
important to be clear about what the aims of cannabis policy should be. Drug policy 
to date has (almost) always been driven by political and ideological agendas that 
have ignored scientific, public health and social policy norms. The panel identified its 
primary goals as protecting and enhancing public health and community safety – 
with a particular focus on the health and well being of vulnerable and marginalised 
populations; most obviously children, young people and people with mental health 
issues. We are fully aware of the health harms associated with cannabis use, but 
contend that a rational policy must pragmatically manage the reality of use as it 
currently exists, rather than attempt to eradicate it using punitive enforcement; an 
approach that, however well intentioned, has historically proved to be ineffective and 
counterproductive.     
The panel acknowledged the importance of a consideration of human rights and 
noted that within the context of a legal framework where cannabis possession and 
use is no longer criminalised, and adults have legal access to the drug, such concerns 
are largely addressed and are of less critical importance than the precise details of a 
regulation model.  
Similarly, whilst acknowledging the importance of considering the international 
development and security impacts of illicit drug policy more broadly, the panel 
noted that most cannabis consumed in the UK is now produced domestically so does 
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not have the international impacts associated with heroin and cocaine, for example. 
This would continue to be the case under our recommendations, so the international 
dimension is less relevant here.    
The panel acknowledged the importance of any policy expenditure delivering good 
value for money in terms of the outcomes it achieves. Part of this economic equation 
is the possibility of generating meaningful economic activity (including jobs) and tax 
revenue for the government, as well as saving money currently spent on cannabis 
enforcement across the criminal justice system. Whilst these outcomes may be a 
consideration, the panel considered them to be secondary to the primary goals of 
public health and community safety. The economic benefits of reform should be 
seen as a bonus rather than the overriding motivation.    
Principles   
All policy should be based on evidence of what works in delivering on our shared 
goals, within accepted social values.  Historically, however, UK drug policy has been 
characterised by untested policies with inadequate and unstructured evaluation. The 
panel was therefore keen to stress that a comprehensive and properly resourced 
monitoring and evaluation framework should be built into any new policy from the 
outset. Furthermore, the new policy should feature a clearly legislated annual review 
and reporting mechanism, so that it can be evaluated against key agreed outcome 
indicators. The panel acknowledge that this is a complex policy area in which there 
may be shifting or conflicting policy priorities. Decisions will sometimes involve 
pragmatic balancing acts that need to be periodically revisited. The legislation, and 
its regulatory framework, must be suitably flexible, and regulatory authorities willing 
and able to adapt the model in light of emerging evidence of what does and does 
not work in terms of delivering the public health and community safety goals. 
All policy change involves a degree of risk. Whilst there are important lessons to 
inform this discussion from the regulation of other potentially risky products (most 
obviously alcohol, tobacco and pharmaceuticals), and a growing body of evidence 
from jurisdictions experimenting with various cannabis regulation models (in the 
Netherlands, Uruguay, Spain, the USA and elsewhere), there are also unknowns. 
Acknowledging this, we recommend a cautious approach that errs on the side of a 
more restrictive regulatory model in the first instance, with a careful and phased 
policy development and implementation process. We suggest that it is preferable to 
relax initial regulations that prove to be overly restrictive rather than attempt to 
retro-fit stricter regulation into a model that proves inadequately regulated (as has 
happened with tobacco, for example).  A more cautious approach also has the 
benefit of reassuring sceptical or understandably wary members of the public and 
policy makers, whose legitimate concerns should not be ignored.   
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Finally, it is important to stress that any regulatory framework is only as good as its 
enforcement. A new cannabis regulation model should be appropriately enforced, 
and in line with the previous principle, we suggest erring on the side of more, rather 
than less, vigorous enforcement at the outset. 
 
Medical cannabis 
  
We have not made a detailed case for reform or offered substantive 
recommendations regarding the regulation of cannabis or cannabis based products 
for medical uses. This was beyond the remit of the panel and its terms of reference. 
We do, however, acknowledge the urgent importance of addressing this issue and 
encourage government to actively engage with, and move forward with, the relevant 
questions.  
 
It is clear that there is considerable cross over between the issues of medical and non 
medical cannabis regulation, both in terms of practicalities of different regulation 
models and how they would interact, and the intersection of the political debates, 
specifically how the politics around non-medical cannabis use has created barriers to 
research and access to medicines.  
As a starting point, however, the panel would like to express support for the 
immediate rescheduling of cannabis in the UK (and at international/UN level) to a 
schedule 2 substance (to facilitate the cannabis research agenda), and also endorse 
the www.endourpain.org campaign to “change the law to allow doctors to prescribe 
cannabis where they consider it would help their patients; and for patients to have 
their prescription honoured at the pharmacy.”    
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Exploring a spectrum of options for regulating 
cannabis 
We recognise the unique risks associated with the use of any drug, including 
cannabis, and argue that these legitimise a higher level of state intervention in the 
production and sale of such products than exists for more conventional goods, such 
as groceries, for example.  
 
 
Looking at the spectrum of policy options between unregulated criminal markets 
under prohibition at one extreme and unregulated legal markets under a free market 
model at the other, alongside earlier and also more recent conceptual analysis (eg. 
the multi-criteria decision analysis4), we argue that it is between these poles that the 
optimal regulatory model will be found (as illustrated in the graphic above). A 
regulatory framework naturally means that some activities would remain prohibited, 
such as sales or supply to under-18s for example, and be subject to proportionate 
civil or criminal sanctions. Clearly, even in a post-prohibition scenario there are a 
range of options available. The question at hand, therefore, concerns the precise 
nature and intensity of regulation applied to each element of the market. We work 
through these in turn and make recommendations below.  
                                                          
4 A recent reworking of the MCDA model, undertaken by the DrugScience group working with four of the panel members, 
looked at how different drug policy regulatory frameworks impact on cannabis harms (publications forthcoming)  
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We now have useful lessons to draw on from real world cannabis policy, from the 
more strictly state-controlled models such as Uruguay’s, through to the more 
commercial market-oriented models such as Colorado’s in the US.  In line with the 
more cautious approach already outlined we recommend a position closer to the 
Uruguay model as the sensible starting point for the UK. We acknowledge that, once 
established, the regulatory framework should be reviewed and potentially be relaxed 
as new social controls and norms around the emerging legal market evolve.   
We are acutely aware of the tension between public health and private profit in drug 
markets (for medical and non medical uses – although we are focusing here on the 
latter). Commercial entities will naturally seek to maximise profits by increasing sales. 
This tends to mean seeking to increase consumption, and the initiation of new users 
– with potentially negative public health impacts, as evident from the history of 
under-regulated alcohol and tobacco industries. It is notable that, as with alcohol, a 
minority of heavy or problematic cannabis users consume the majority of all 
cannabis produced. This means that commercial retailers and suppliers have an 
incentive to target the most problematic or potentially problematic users in order to 
boost profits. Cannabis regulation offers a unique opportunity to build a regulated 
market model from the start, making decisions in the public interest without the 
potentially corrupting influence of lobbying from a powerful established industry. 
We have a responsibility to make sure the mistakes of the past with alcohol and 
tobacco are not repeated.   
One of our key considerations in developing this framework was therefore to avoid 
or minimise the risks of over-commercialisation. We have considered a number of 
ways in which this could be achieved, including government monopolies over all or 
part of the market, restricting the trade to public-interest companies, or not-for-
profit entities such as cannabis social clubs. We also considered the ‘Borland 
regulated market model5’ developed for tobacco control. This model seeks to 
eliminate market incentives to increase use, but maintains elements of commercial 
competition at the supply and retail ends of the market. It establishes a state agency 
that acts as licensee and sole buyer from producers (who compete for the contract), 
and also the sole supplier to licensed retailers (who can compete with each other 
within market parameters established by the agency). This is essentially the model 
adopted in Uruguay. 
Having explored the pros and cons of these different options we have recommended 
a strictly regulated model. Whilst not exactly matching, our proposal draws on 
elements of these different options so as to minimise the risks of over-
commercialisation, particularly around industry lobbying and marketing practices. It 
                                                          
5 Borland, R. 2003 'A strategy for controlling the marketing of tobacco products: a regulated market model' BMJ tobacco 
control 12:374-382 doi:10.1136/tc.12.4.374   http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/12/4/374.full 
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is a model we believe will be practical within the political and cultural environment 
of the UK.    
Key elements of the proposed model (explored in more detail below) include:  
 Establishment of a new Cannabis Regulatory Agency (CRA) 
 Licensing (via the CRA) of producers, and what products they can produce 
 Limiting the size of individual producers, and preventing ‘vertical integration’ 
of producers and vendors, to prevent the emergence of a powerful industry 
lobby 
 Allowing small scale home cultivation within clearly defined parameters 
 Licensing (via the CRA) the operation of non-profit ‘cannabis social clubs’ 
within clearly defined parameters 
 Licensing of sales (via the CRA and local authorities) – with appropriate 
controls over products (preparation, price, potency, packaging), vendors 
(mandated responsible vendor training, provision of health advice to 
consumers at point of sale), outlets (location, hours of opening, signage), and 
marketing (bans on branding, promotions and advertising) 
 Controls over access to retail sales (eg. minimum purchase age controls), and 
consumption (eg. bans on smoking in public spaces)   
  
Institutional and decision making framework  
Different elements of decision making will need to operate at different levels of 
government. We recommend the establishment of a new, publically run, national 
Cannabis Regulation Agency (CRA). The body would oversee the licensing of 
production, products, outlets and vendors, and sales. There are a number of different 
Government departments that such an agency would cut across (Treasury, Health, 
Business Innovation and Skills, Home Office, and Justice), but we propose that it sit 
jointly under the Department of Health and Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills. One Minister should have overall responsibility for the policy, as it will be 
necessary for someone to lead on the issue and drive it forward in its early stages. 
As is the case with alcohol licensing, local authorities should be responsible for local 
licensing decisions (within parameters established by the CRA and responsible 
minister), such as location, density of outlets, and opening hours. There would also 
be a role for the Home Office and Ministry of Justice to enforce the regulatory 
infrastructure in conjunction with local police forces.  
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Production 
We propose that there would be three ways in which cannabis could be produced for 
adult use: unlicensed home growing for personal use, small scale licensed 
production for membership based ‘cannabis social clubs’, and larger scale licensed 
production for retail sales. As is the case in Uruguay, the three production-supply 
routes can exist in parallel.    
Home growing 
We recommend home growing by individuals for personal use should be permitted 
under certain conditions. The key goals of such conditionality would be to prevent 
larger scale, informal, unlicensed production and sale for profit, and to restrict access 
to non-adults.  
Licensing of home growing would be possible but, we suspect, impractical due to 
bureaucracy, and likely to be widely ignored. So, based on experiences in multiple 
jurisdictions, we propose that home growing would be permitted for adults but with 
a limit on the number of plants per individual or residence with enforceable penalties 
for breaching.  
Home growing is allowed under a number of legislated models around the world, 
with a different number of plants under each.  In Uruguay the limit is nine plants, in 
Colorado, Washington DC and Alaska it is six plants (of which only three can be 
mature/flowering), and in Oregon it is four plants. Some European jurisdictions, 
including Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands, also informally tolerate limited home 
growing within their policies of non-criminalisation of possession and use.  
Based on these experiences we propose a limit of four plants would be reasonable, 
but also acknowledge that strict enforcement of such limits in private residences 
would be problematic, so suggest that such numbers would be used to limit or 
moderate production, specifically regarding secondary for-profit sales. Some degree 
of social supply, sharing, or not for profit sales, would be inevitable (as with home 
brewing) – and would need to be pragmatically tolerated, but with supply to under-
18s naturally remaining an enforceable offence, as would be the case under all 
production/availability models (see below).  
It seems likely that if cannabis is available via retail outlets, home growing would 
become a minority pursuit, as most users will default to the convenience of retail, as 
has been the case in the Netherlands. This is also evident for alcohol, where home 
brewing and winemaking are minority pursuits.  
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Cannabis Social Clubs (CSCs)  
Cannabis user-activists in Spain have exploited a legal grey area of the country’s 
drug laws by establishing so-called ‘cannabis social clubs’ (CSCs). The CSCs take 
advantage of the Spanish decriminalisation law that nominally tolerates small scale 
cultivation for personal use. Club members allocate their allowance to the club, 
which then grows the pooled allocation of plants and supplies club members from a 
designated venue.  
The clubs – now numbering more than 400 – follow a voluntary code of practice, and 
are relatively self-contained and self-regulating entities, operating on a not-for-profit 
basis to produce cannabis for registered club members only. This has helped ensure 
that there is little diversion of cannabis from the club to the illicit market, and that 
access is subject to checks and age controls. As not for profit entities, the clubs also 
have no financial incentive to increase consumption or initiate new users.  
Where problems have arisen with the CSCs in Spain (some much larger clubs 
appearing in urban centres, thereby moving away from the original small scale, non-
profit ethos), it is primarily due to the lack of formal regulation. Uruguay has 
established a formal framework for CSCs and the panel see merits in similarly 
allowing CSCs along the lines of the Spanish model to exist in the UK, so long as 
they are subject to a formal regulation framework that includes: 
 A licensing framework for the club management, venues and grow operations 
 Limiting the size of clubs to less than 100 adult members  
 Limits on per-member production and supply, and a prohibition on sales to 
non-members  
 Establishing clubs as not-for-profit entities 
 
As with home growing, it seems likely that CSCs would only cater for a minority of 
cannabis ‘connoisseurs’ once a legal retail supply was established. They would be 
able to make available a wider range of niche cannabis products (such as a wider 
variety of strains, resin and concentrates) that would not, initially at least, be 
available via a retail market (see below).  
Licensed production for a retail market 
We recommend that supply to a retail market would be via licensed UK-based 
producers only. The Cannabis Regulatory Authority would license the production of a 
fixed volume of specified products from each licensee. This volume would be flexible 
and subject to review in light of changing market demand. We considered the 
Uruguay model of the CRA being the licensee and sole buyer (like the Borland model 
described above) but determined that a licensed producer model, combined with a 
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ban on vertical integration between producer and retailers, could deliver similar 
outcomes with a less onerous regulatory burden.  
The panel discussed the ‘seed to sale’ model adopted in some US states, where 
individual cannabis plants are tagged and traceable through every stage from 
growth, manufacture and sale. The systems are designed to minimise the risk of 
diversion of cannabis into unlicensed sales, unlicensed production entering the 
market, and tax avoidance. It was noted that despite being a management resource 
burden, where this system is in place, it is reportedly working effectively. The panel 
suggest  similar ‘seed to sale’ tracking be established for UK retail production. This is 
one of the aspects of the framework that could be reviewed after a period of time 
and potentially relaxed.  
The panel agreed that the framework would recommend against initially allowing 
any importation or exportation of cannabis. This is primarily because of the 
problematic and evolving international legal environment (see below). This situation 
could change in the future and should be kept under review. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15                                                   A framework for a regulated market for cannabis in the UK 
Products 
Preparation  
There is a broad and growing range of cannabis products available including herbal 
cannabis, cannabis resin, cannabis concentrates and cannabis infused edibles. Dried 
herbal cannabis (which dominates the existing UK market) is the least processed of 
these and correspondingly involves the least complex regulatory challenge. We 
recommend that, as part of the cautious implementation approach (and again 
following Uruguay’s lead), in the first instance licensed retail sales should be limited 
exclusively to herbal cannabis.  If there is demand for other preparations/products 
that is not legally met, this could create opportunities for criminal markets. However, 
we think that legal supply of herbal cannabis would meet the majority of demand, 
and the alternative CSC supply route would potentially be able to cater better for 
those who wish to access more niche cannabis products.  
We acknowledge that cannabis infused edibles can reduce certain risks (most 
obviously those associated with smoking/inhalation), but also that they are 
associated with their own unique risks (specifically around dosage control). As there 
is currently no significant illicit market for edibles in the UK, making them available 
could change using behaviours in unpredictable ways. Experience from the US also 
suggests that regulation of edibles involves a substantially more complex regulatory 
engagement and has had to evolve rapidly as new and unanticipated challenges 
have emerged. We suggest that licensing production and sale of edibles is 
something that should be actively considered, but we see no need to rush into 
opening an entirely new cannabis product market. It could sensibly wait until there is 
better research on the impact of retail edible availability in US markets, for example 
in a second phase of a UK market development once retail availability of herbal 
cannabis had been established, bedded in and teething problems had been 
addressed.  Making herbal cannabis into edible products is very simple and therefore 
an initial restriction on sales of edibles would not prevent those who so desired them 
from consuming them. If and when cannabis infused edible products are made 
available for retail, they should be subject to strict controls. Learning from the US 
experience we would specifically recommend that they are only available in clearly 
labelled single dose units, and should avoid cannabis infused confectionery likely to 
appeal to children.  
There is a more substantive established illicit UK market for cannabis resin and, if it 
became clear that demand for resin remained, despite the availability of retail herbal 
cannabis, then the establishment of a licit production and supply route to retail 
should be considered.  
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There is currently no significant established illicit market in the UK for the highly 
concentrated cannabis extracts (such as Butane Hash Oil, or BHO) that are growing in 
popularity in some US markets. These high potency products (some containing over 
80% THC) are a relative unknown in terms of their risks and health impacts, although 
it seems reasonable to assume that they are associated with some elevated risks 
compared to lower potency products. Therefore, given the concerns and unknowns 
surrounding manufacture and use of these high potency products for recreational 
purposes, we see no reason to open the market to retail sales of these products 
when herbal cannabis will be available6.  Resins, concentrates and other more niche 
products could be made available via CSCs, however, so that there is at least a way of 
meeting demand where it exists. We note that some concentrate extraction 
processes are potentially quite dangerous so may require additional tiers of 
licensing/regulation within a CSC framework.  
The panel also noted the emergence and growing popularity in US markets of vaping 
technology that dispenses cannabis oil vapour (electronic cannabis delivery systems 
or ECDS) rather than the more familiar nicotine vapour from ‘e-cigarettes’ (electronic 
nicotine delivery systems or ENDS). We acknowledge that from a public health point 
of view it is preferable for people to consume cannabis through ECDS (compared 
with smoking), although we recommend regulation around the safety and quality of 
any future legal vaping devices and contents, beyond the relatively limited regulation 
currently deployed for ENDS (we note regulations around ENDS are being 
substantially reformed at EU level this year). Amongst the variety of non-herbal 
processed cannabis products there is a good argument for prioritising the availability 
of ECDS which offer similar harm reduction benefits over smoking of joints that 
ENDS offer over traditional cigarettes. However, as with cannabis infused edibles, we 
suggest that such availability be cautiously explored during a second phase of 
market development when clearer lessons can be drawn from the US experience.     
As part of an effort to encourage alternatives to smoking cannabis (which has 
intrinsic risks to lung health) particularly when mixed with tobacco (which has 
additional risks associated with dependence and acting as a gateway to tobacco use) 
we recommend that herbal cannabis be sold only in loose form (i.e. no sales of pre-
rolled ‘joints’). Efforts should also be made – through vendors, information available 
at point of sale, and other education channels - to educate people who use cannabis 
about relative lower risk associated with devices that heat herbal tobacco to release 
a vapour that is inhaled, when compared to burning herbal tobacco in a pipe and 
inhaling the smoke. 
                                                          
6 We note that these high potency products may have specific uses for medical cannabis patients, and therefore suggest 
rescheduling of cannabis could help address potential restrictions of availability for medical usage. 
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We do not recommend including any synthetic cannabinoid products under this 
regulatory framework or within the purview of the CRA. We do not think there is a 
market for these products except where people are unable to access other forms of 
cannabis. As such, a regulated framework for herbal cannabis is likely to reduce some 
of the current market in synthetics. 
Potency  
We took evidence from Professor Val Curran, the UK’s leading expert on the effects 
of cannabis on the brain. She explained that cannabis risks (of dependence, 
psychosis and memory impairment) are increased with cannabis that contained high 
levels of THC (responsible for the ‘high’ users experience) and low levels of 
cannabidiol (CBD, which moderates some of the effects of the THC). This is precisely 
the type of cannabis (often somewhat un-scientifically, labelled as ‘skunk’ in the UK 
public debate) that has increasingly dominated the UK illicit market in recent years. 
THC content has risen over recent years from around 5% (on average) in the mid-
nineties to 14% and over nowadays. At the same time CBD in cannabis has fallen in 
many varieties to near zero.  
For a regulated market to effectively displace the illicit market it needs to be able to 
meet existing demand, even if efforts can be made using the opportunities 
regulation offers to encourage moves towards healthier consumption behaviours 
over the longer term. On this basis we recommend that the CRA licenses producers 
to grow, at a minimum, three different strains of herbal cannabis to supply the retail 
market: one lower potency (5% THC), one medium potency (10% THC), and one of 
higher potency (15% THC). This is in line with the Uruguayan approach, and should 
be able to cater for the significant majority of demand. A wider variety of cannabis 
strains could potentially be licensed in the future, and the model proposed would 
also be available for the more niche ‘connoisseur’ market in the short term via home 
growing or CSCs. Making lower potency cannabis available is important because 
many existing cannabis users can only access high potency varieties via the illicit 
market - even if, as if often the case, they would opt for something milder if given 
the choice (just as most people drink beers and wines rather than spirits).   
Notably, Professor Curran made clear that the risks associated with THC exposure are 
significantly moderated by the presence of CBD. For this reason we recommend that 
all retail herbal cannabis include a minimum CBD content ‘buffer’, which ideally 
should be set at 4%.  
 It is important for consumers to be fully aware of what they are buying. We 
recommend that the there should be routine independent monitoring of strength 
and potency of THC and CBD content at both production and retail stages of the 
market, supported by clear labelling of all products (see below). Any mis-labelling or 
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mis-selling at production or retail point should be considered a serious licensing 
violation.   
Packaging  
We recommend that plain packaging should be mandatory for all retail cannabis, 
with standardised non-branded designs along the lines of prescription 
pharmaceuticals (see below). Licensed medical cannabis products available in 
Europe, such as ‘Bedrocan’ in the Netherlands, provide a useful model. 
 
We note that packaging can be used in a positive way to educate consumers, 
influence using behaviours, and thereby improve public health outcomes.  We 
therefore recommend that product labels, as well as providing basic information 
about the product and potency, should have mandated information and warnings 
about key health risks and how to minimise or avoid them. More detailed health 
information should be included on printed inserts with all retail sales, similar to 
those that accompany all prescription medicines.  This packaging information, and its 
prominence, should be informed by the most recent and most robust evidence base 
on harm.  
All packaging should be in re-sealable childproof containers – again, of the kind 
used for prescription medicines.   
Price 
Price is a potentially useful regulatory tool at governments’ disposal. We 
acknowledge, however, that price controls can face conflicting priorities, as has been 
the case with tobacco, for example.  Increasing prices may dissuade use but also 
encourage a criminal market that undercuts these prices. Conversely, reducing prices 
to help stamp out the illicit trade may inadvertently encourage increased use. Clearly 
there is balance to be struck and, as it is hard to predict precisely how the parallel 
licit and illicit markets will evolve and respond to changing prices, we make the 
following recommendations.  
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Firstly, in the initial phase of implementation, a greater degree of state control over 
pricing would be advisable, involving either direct price fixing, or maximum and 
minimum price controls for all retail sales. To avoid unpredictable impacts of 
dramatic price changes, we suggest that market prices are initially set at or near 
current illicit market prices.  
Secondly, an effective monitoring framework, as recommended, should allow 
impacts of pricing controls to be closely evaluated, and adjustments made relatively 
quickly. Maintaining the flexibility and responsiveness of price controls will be an 
important role for the CRA in the early stages of implementation. Stricter price 
controls during this period could be reviewed and potentially relaxed as and when 
the framework is established and the anticipated benefits and challenges have been 
identified. We recommend, however, that a minimum pricing policy be maintained 
and that deep discounting, giveaways, and ‘2 for 1’ type deals are prohibited (much 
like the direction of development in controls on alcohol sales).  
Pricing controls should relate directly to THC content by weight (e.g. a gram of 15% 
potency cannabis should cost approximately three times that of a gram of 5% 
potency). On top of this, we also recommend that the CRA explore the idea of 
creating an artificial regulatory price gradient, applying additional costs to sales of 
higher potency products, and fewer costs to lower potency products. There is 
evidence from similar approaches to alcohol pricing in some jurisdictions that such 
an approach could moderate total THC consumption.  
Cannabis markets and patterns of use do not exist in isolation from other licit and 
illicit drugs. Changes in pricing that impact on cannabis use may also impact on 
levels of alcohol use (and to a lesser extent other drugs), although current research 
on the impacts is inconclusive. We recommend that such interactions and impacts of 
regulatory interventions are subject to meaningful ongoing research and evaluation 
as part of wider monitoring commitments, and that relevant findings inform both the 
development of cannabis and alcohol policy – and drug policy more broadly – going 
forward. 
Taxation 
Taxation of retail cannabis offers the potential for significant government revenue. 
Depending on how legal markets develop, and the taxation regimes adopted, 
credible estimates put this in the region of £500million to £1billion annually.  Our 
view is that taxation policy should be subservient to public health and social policy 
goals, and maximising taxation revenue should not be a primary goal in itself. We 
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have seen how income streams from alcohol and tobacco taxation revenue can 
distort Government public health priorities in the UK and around the world.  
Taxation rates are closely linked to pricing policy and controls (see above).  We note 
that there will be a significant gap between unit production costs – which are likely 
to be far lower in a legal market – and retail prices if the latter are initially 
maintained at or near current illicit-market levels using minimum unit pricing, as 
proposed. Unless a state monopoly was established, this gap will necessarily be filled 
by substantial profit margins for commercial producers and retailers or, similarly to 
legal tobacco sales, a substantial tax haul for government (or some balance of the 
two). We propose that tax revenue should, as the default position, be preferred over 
what would be potentially inordinate profit margins for commercial entities and that 
a reasonable accommodation be found accordingly. Once again, a balance needs to 
be struck, in this case one that allows a reasonable profit margin for commercial 
entities, and does not set taxation rates so high that significant incentives are created 
for tax avoidance or the diversion of legally produced cannabis for sale on the illegal 
market. 
Various tax mechanisms exist: tax by unit weight, by THC content, or a fixed rate 
value-added tax (VAT). In addition to this tax revenue generated from cannabis 
production and sales, there will also be tax revenue from industry-related earnings 
and wages, and potentially from other sources such as licence fees.   
We propose that a system based on taxation of both production and sales, with THC 
content by weight being the taxable unit, is a sensible starting point. The detail of 
such decisions would need to be incorporated into wider pricing policy 
considerations, and fit within the needs of existing tax frameworks.  
Ring-fencing a portion of cannabis tax revenue for drug treatment, prevention and 
harm reduction education (or other social programmes) is a proposition that has 
featured in both US and Uruguayan policy developments. We acknowledge that this 
is politically attractive proposition, but it is also problematic. In our view, drug 
services should be properly funded regardless of whether cannabis regulation goes 
ahead, and how much revenue is raised under the regulated framework. Public 
health interventions should be funded according to need, not be dependent on 
sales. There is no reason, however, why it could not be argued that parallel 
developments that include increased investment in health interventions and drug 
services as part of a wider policy realignment (something that is certainly needed 
and that we strongly advocate), will be cost neutral overall.  The same argument can 
also be made regarding the costs of setting up and maintaining the necessary 
regulatory infrastructure which will easily be covered by the new tax revenue, and 
savings across the criminal justice system.  
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Branding and Marketing  
We recommend that the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control and WHO guidelines for alcohol control provide the framework 
for marketing and advertising controls. Marketing should be tightly controlled and 
only allowed for the limited purpose of ensuring awareness of the legal availability of 
cannabis products, but not to promote the use of cannabis products generally or of 
any particular product. Particular attention should be paid to preventing exposure of 
non-adults to any form of marketing or advertising.  
As outlined above, retail cannabis products should be non-branded and subject to 
mandatory plain packaging, with the aim of ensuring functional availability whilst 
avoiding glamorising or encouraging use, or associating products with aspirational 
lifestyle choices.  
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Vendors 
Vendors have a crucial role in any cannabis regulation model. Firstly, they act as 
gatekeepers of the market, entrusted with exercising regulatory access controls, 
enforcing restrictions on sales relating to age, intoxication or other criteria. Secondly, 
the vendor-customer interaction provides a vital opportunity for targeted public 
health interventions, educating cannabis users about the risks of different products, 
harm minimisation, responsible use and where to get help or further information.   
We recommend that all retail managers and vendors who interact with customers 
should operate within a system of responsible vending guidelines (with the 
Australian system for alcohol vending providing a useful model). Experience with 
tobacco, and particularly alcohol, suggests voluntary codes of practice for 
responsible service training are inadequate and not universally adopted, so we 
recommend that this condition be legally mandated and enforced as a key part of 
retail licenses, including for vendors in CSCs.  
 
Mandatory training should ensure vendors understand the health impacts of 
cannabis and can communicate them to customers (or CSC members) who require 
the information, as well as being able to recognise the signs of intoxication and 
excessive use and refer individuals to the relevant services as appropriate. They will 
be required to refuse service to people who are obviously already intoxicated with 
alcohol, cannabis or any other drug. Development and delivery of such a responsible 
vending training/licensing scheme should be managed either by public health 
professionals or through an academic institution.  
Licensing and training conditions for vendors would need to be adapted as 
appropriate to distinguish between those working in venues which sell cannabis to 
be consumed off premises, and those where people consume cannabis products on 
site (this would mean cannabis social clubs under this proposed framework, but 
possibly Dutch-style cannabis cafes in the future). The latter would necessitate 
additional training requirements for dealing with customers who require care or 
monitoring.  
Vendors will be required to ask customers during each transaction whether they 
have used cannabis before and if they would like any information about the health 
impact of use and to provide follow up information. 
Vendor licenses should be assessed and granted through local authorities (within 
parameters established by the CRA and relevant minister), as is the case with alcohol 
licensing. A benefit of this is that it allows local authorities to grant or refuse licenses, 
taking into account the needs of their local area. We would expect a national-level 
framework to be in place that would make recommendations on how cumulative 
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impact assessments should be carried out, and on local considerations such as the 
density of outlets. 
Experience with tobacco and alcohol also demonstrates that, where commercial 
pressures exist, they can lead to vendors failing to meet their responsibilities 
voluntarily, so adequate enforcement is crucial. Failure to meet requirements should 
be dealt with in line with the existing penalties for breaching alcohol licenses, using a 
hierarchy of penalties including fines and withdrawal of license.  
 
Any regulatory framework is only as good as its enforcement, so we strongly 
encourage regular and meaningful efforts to ensure that all vendors meet licensing 
requirements. 
Online vendors 
We are conscious that people with health conditions and people who live in more 
remote rural communities may not be able to visit traditional shops or access CSCs 
easily, and we would not want these people to be arbitrarily denied access or have to 
fall back on the illicit market. It also seems inevitable that some sort of online market 
will need to exist and that it is therefore preferable to bring it under the purview of 
the regulated framework early on, to prevent informal online markets filling the void.  
For this reason, we consider some form of regulated online retail and delivery service 
as a necessity, even if it is part of a ‘phase two’ market development. We suggest 
that, as far as possible, any such online retailing should seek to maintain the key 
benefits of face to face vending outlined above. Whilst this option requires more 
careful development, we recommend that key elements could include:  
 Appropriate methods for age verification at the point of purchase 
 Requiring online customers to answer a series of standardised short tick-box 
questions to confirm they understand the health implications of cannabis use. As 
part of these questions, customers would be asked if they would like to talk to 
anyone about their cannabis use 
 Requiring licensed online outlets to employ trained health advisors who can 
engage with customers through an online chat facility when customers say that 
this is something they feel they would benefit from 
 Potentially having a licensed/registered buyer scheme to allow access to online 
sales, or membership of a CSC that included a delivery service   
 Online vendors should be subject to the same licensing process as shops and 
CSCs 
 Individual online businesses could also have licensing limits on total volume of 
sales  
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Outlets  
We have proposed that there would be three options for legal cannabis availability:  
 Dedicated cannabis retail outlets (including online retail/delivery in the future – 
see above) 
 Cannabis social clubs 
 Home growing 
 
Initially, we do not recommend the introduction of Dutch-style cannabis cafes that 
permit on-site consumption, but would suggest that this model could be revisited at 
a later stage. Cannabis social clubs could, to some extent, meet demand for such 
premises.  
Cannabis products should be sold in dedicated single-purpose retail outlets. These 
would be licensed premises, with licenses granted through application to the local 
authority within guidelines established by the CRA. We recommend that retail outlets 
should not be able to sell both alcohol and cannabis. We anticipate that people will 
consume cannabis in pub gardens, subject to existing laws around smoking in public 
places (and alongside any rules imposed by individual venues). Imposing conditions 
on alcohol licensing to try and prevent this would be possible but probably 
impractical to enforce.  
Our view is that cannabis retail outlets should be simple and functional (similar to 
pharmacies), rather than ‘destination’ or ‘experience’ retailers. We discussed whether 
there was a case for tighter regulations on outlet interiors, to ensure they are as 
functional and practical as possible, but agreed that this would be problematic to 
implement in practice. Decisions on such matters should sensibly sit with local 
licensing authorities, acting on best practice guidance from the CRA. However, we 
would recommend that external signage be regulated. As is the case with cannabis 
cafes in the Netherlands, they should not have highly visible signage that advertises 
what is sold inside. This would help mitigate against impulse purchases or curiosity-
led initiation of people with no previous history of cannabis use.  
Within the retail premises, products should be kept out of view, and sold over the 
counter as is now the case with tobacco sales.  By having to interact with the vendor 
for each sale, there is the opportunity for customers to be offered product 
information and health advice during every transaction (see above).  
Hours of opening for retail outlets should be stipulated by the local authority via the 
licensing process, so that they can reflect what is appropriate for the local area. 
However, we think it is reasonable to expect that their opening hours be similar to 
those of pubs or off-licenses.  
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In Uruguay, cannabis will only be sold over the counter in specially licensed 
pharmacies. Given the form of retail outlets we have proposed – which draw heavily 
on the pharmacy retail model – we naturally considered having existing pharmacies 
as at least one possible outlet option. We were concerned, however, that pharmacists 
may feel it is in conflict with their duty of medical care to dispense cannabis for non-
medical use. We suggest that the idea is not closed, but is explored with the relevant 
retailers and professional bodies to see if it is a viable option in the UK.  
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User controls 
Age controls 
The sale of cannabis will be subject to age restrictions. We recommend that this 
should be in line with current age limits for buying alcohol (eighteen years and over), 
and purchases should similarly require identification for those who look under 25 (a 
different age verification process will be needed for online sales). Unlike the current 
situation in the UK with alcohol and tobacco, we recommend that adequate 
resources are provided to enforce age restrictions from the outset. Under-age sales 
should be considered a serious offence that could lead to fines or loss of license.  
Under-18s caught in possession should be subject to police confiscation powers and 
be dealt with via case-appropriate referrals, in line with alcohol and tobacco policy.   
Volume sales limits  
We recommend limits on the amount of cannabis which can be purchased at any 
one time. This is already the case under the frameworks in Uruguay, the US, the 
Netherlands, and Spain’s CSCs. We have not recommended a specific amount and 
suggest that this should be based on international evidence and advice from public 
health professionals. We would seek advice on whether this should be based on 
weight, THC level or both (on a sliding scale). Whilst such limits are only likely to 
have a marginal impact on moderating use, they can help avoid large-scale diversion 
into secondary informal and illicit markets.7   
Consumption 
We considered whether additional regulations would be required to try and limit, or 
discourage, smoking of cannabis in public spaces, as a way of addressing potential 
issues related to both second-hand smoking and anti-social behaviour. We 
recommend that cannabis smoking in public places is limited in line with the existing 
legislation banning tobacco smoking in public places and we would seek advice on 
whether the legislation needs modification. Similarly, we considered that existing 
anti-social behaviour legislation would suffice for cannabis-related public disorder 
issues.     
Rules around the vaping of cannabis products in public places should be brought 
into line with current or future nicotine vaping rules.  
                                                          
7 There is evidence of displacement from legal to illicit markets in some areas of the UK in relation to synthetic 
cannabinoids (Linnell, M., Measham, F., & Newcombe, R. (2015). 'New psychoactive substances: The local picture, a 
research study and needs assessment for Blackburn with Darwen Council. Manchester': Linnell Publications).  
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Sanctions and penalties  
People who consume, sell or produce cannabis outside the parameters of a 
regulatory framework should be subject to appropriate and proportionate sanctions 
and penalties. These can be civil or administrative in nature, and should only involve 
criminal sanctions for the most serious offences where harm to others is involved, or 
potentially for repeat offenders. 
We recommend that such penalties should be in line with those around illegal 
production, sale or consumption of alcohol, tobacco or pharmaceuticals. 
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Driving under the influence of cannabis 
There is compelling evidence that driving under the influence of cannabis can 
increase the risk of accidents (even though there is some dispute within the 
academic literature over the scale of such effects). Such behaviour endangers drivers, 
passengers and other road users. On this basis we recommend that it remains an 
offense to drive whilst significantly impaired by cannabis, similar to the law relating 
to impairment from alcohol or other drugs.    
There is a simple and clear message: people should not drive while significantly 
impaired by cannabis and should, as with alcohol or other drugs, expect a 
proportionate punitive legal sanction if they are caught doing so. In this context 
clearly highlighting behaviours that are likely to result in penalties for impairment, 
and how this can be measured, becomes important for both public education and for 
defining enforcement parameters.  
 
The THC threshold for a driving offence in the UK currently is 2 nanograms per 
millilitre of blood.  Some panel members raised serious doubts about the fairness of 
the law as the limit is potentially set much too low so that it is likely to capture some 
individuals who are not significantly impaired (particularly as cannabis can remain in 
the body long after any impairment effects have dissipated).  There are also technical 
issues around how effectively roadside testing, and blood testing, can directly infer 
impairment as the basis of a prosecution, particularly in the absence of impairment 
testing8. The panel therefore agreed that the current policy should be subject to 
early and regular reviews in light of emerging evidence.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 For more discussion see the chapter on cannabis and Driving in Rolles S, and Murkin, G. 2013 ‘Regulating Cannabis; A 
Practical Guide’ http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/how-regulate-cannabis-practical-guide 
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Cannabis prevention, harm reduction and risk 
education 
Cannabis prevention, harm reduction and treatment activities should be considered 
as being part of a continuum of responses, and proceed in line with existing high 
quality evidence based guidelines and quality standards, including those published 
by the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence and the United Nations9.  
Prevention may be orientated towards objectives of cannabis abstention or delayed 
initiation, but overall, any actions that aim to reduce individual, population, or 
societal harms from use, and promote wellbeing, are important. For example, 
delaying age of initiation of cannabis use is an important objective, because cannabis 
use in adolescence, particularly heavy use, has been associated with poorer long 
term health, educational and economic outcomes.    
In the UK, prevention is typically delivered in the form of school based drugs 
education. However, whilst there is a developing international evidence base for 
effective approaches and programmes, school based delivery in the UK has 
historically been poor and pupils may receive as little as one hour of drugs education 
a year. Considering the lack of curriculum time and resources available, it is 
recommended that where evidence based programmes cannot be delivered, general 
approaches to develop health and social competencies delivered as part of subjects 
such as Personal Social Health and Economic Education (PSHE) should be prioritised. 
A focus on general rather than cannabis specific skills development is a pragmatic 
education response, and has the benefit of not artificially differentiating between the 
range of health and social challenges that young people face. Where individuals or 
particular population segments have been evaluated to be at greater risk of potential 
harms associated with cannabis use, whether as a result of lifestyle, environment or 
biopsychosocial factors, more intensive cannabis focused support is justified. 
However, in accordance with emerging scientific evidence, whilst cannabis use might 
be a focus of support, such actions must address all underlying needs.  
Treatment presentations for cannabis related disorders have been increasing in 
recent years in the UK, particularly in young people. Although it is difficult to predict 
whether treatment demand will change as a result of new regulatory environments, 
current challenges to treatment systems, including funding, access to treatment, 
                                                          
9 Including: Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs Recovery Committee’s paper, Prevention of Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence (February 2015); United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s International Standards on Drug Use Prevention 
(February 2015); and NICE Quality Standard on drug use disorder in adults (QS23) (November 2012) 
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quality of treatment, staff competencies, and assessment of treatment goals will 
need to be addressed10.   
Cannabis harm reduction approaches should focus on persuading users to avoid 
consuming tobacco, and avoiding smoking in general (i.e. substituting with vaping or 
other modes of ingestion – see above). There may be a role for vendors in the 
delivery of harm reduction responses. In addition to simple provision of information 
about the effects of cannabis, modes of administration, and potential risks and 
harms associated with use, there may be an opportunity for trained vendors to 
provide screening and brief advice for consumers who wish to reduce their 
consumption or have other concerns about their use. Driving within a few hours of 
cannabis consumption increases the risk of motor vehicle accidents, and cannabis 
vendors should be required to prominently display messages educating customers 
about this. Subsequently, location of CSCs or Dutch-style cannabis cafes that, in the 
future, permit on-site consumption, should be in areas well served by public 
transport.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Monaghan M, Hamilton I, Lloyd C, Paton K (2016) Cannabis matters? Treatment responses to increasing cannabis 
presentations in addiction services in England. Drugs: Education, Prevention, and Policy 23: 54-61 
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Application of the framework – international issues 
Devolved governments 
We acknowledge the complications around the way in which current legislation is 
devolved and reserved, and the potential challenges if not all elements of the Union 
wished to pursue similar reforms, but have not explored these issues in any depth. 
We have made these recommendations on the basis that we think they represent an 
improvement over the status quo and would encourage all Governments – 
Westminster and devolved – to consider applying them. 
European Union   
We acknowledge that there may be issues concerning the development of a 
regulated UK cannabis market in terms of EU trade agreements. These issues concern 
both imports and exports of goods prohibited in different jurisdictions, and 
proposed regulations potentially being considered impediments to free trade 
(noting the ongoing issues around alcohol minimum pricing in Scotland for 
example). The panel did not have the specific expertise or capacity to explore these 
issues but flags them for the attention of the competent authorities. We are not 
proposing import or export at this point and also maintain that our 
recommendations are made in the best interests of UK citizens and UK policy makers 
should seek accommodation within, or review of, relevant EU structures as required, 
to ensure they can be fully implemented.  
UN treaties   
We acknowledge that implementing a regulation model for cannabis in the UK will 
also require that the substantial institutional and political obstacles presented by the 
international drug control system are negotiated. Specifically, such a move creates a 
clear tension with the three UN drug control conventions (1961, 1971, and 1988) that 
the UK has signed and ratified, that unambiguously do not allow such reforms. Other 
reforming jurisdictions have approached this problem in different ways.  
 The US has argued that state level legalisation may be allowable under a 
‘flexible interpretation’ of the treaties 
 Uruguay has argued that its requirement to meet wider UN obligations to 
protect human rights, health, and security take precedence over technical UN 
drug treaty commitments 
 Jamaica has regulated cannabis production and use for ‘religious purposes’  
 Regarding its legalisation of coca leaf (not cannabis) Bolivia has renounced 
the treaties and then re-joined them with a reservation on the specific articles 
that prohibit coca leaf 
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The reality is that this area of drug policy reform is moving into unchartered waters 
in terms of the various, potentially conflicting treaty obligations –and there are 
multiple outstanding questions of international law that are only now beginning to 
be explored in the various high level UN forums. Whilst it is still unclear precisely 
how, or when, these can be addressed satisfactorily, the fact that multiple reforms 
are already underway clearly highlights the shortcomings of an outdated 
international framework that is unable to meet the needs of a growing number of 
member states. It therefore seems inevitable that some form of modernisation 
process must take place to provide the flexibility for evidence based experimentation 
and innovation that is being demanded. We concur with the analysis of the Global 
Commission on Drug Policy, whose members include seven former heads of state, 
and former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan:  
 
“The strength of the UN treaty system is based on the consensus of support from 
member states and the legitimacy of its goals. For the drug control treaties this 
consensus has fractured, and their legitimacy is weakening owing to their negative 
consequences. More and more states are viewing the core punitive elements of the 
drug treaties as not merely inflexible, but outdated, counterproductive and in urgent 
need of reform. If this growing dissent is not accommodated through a meaningful 
formal process to explore reform options, the drug treaty system risks becoming 
even more ineffectual and redundant, as more reform-minded member states 
unilaterally opt to distance themselves from it. 
 
“A weakened drug control system in turn jeopardizes the important role of a United 
Nations framework for regulating access to essential medicines, providing guidance, 
and monitoring compliance with recommended best practice and minimum rights 
standards. Rather than slipping into irrelevance, the ambitions of the treaties to 
regulate medical and scientific uses of drugs need to be extended to embrace the 
regulation of drugs for non-medical uses, in pursuit of the same set of UN goals. 
 
“Unilateral defections from the drug treaties are undesirable from the perspective of 
international relations and a system built on consensus. Yet the integrity of that very 
system is not served in the long run by dogmatic adherence to an outdated and 
dysfunctional normative framework. 
 
“The evolution of legal systems to account for changing circumstances is 
fundamental to their survival and utility, and the regulatory experiments being 
pursued by various states are acting as a catalyst for this process. Indeed, respect for 
the rule of law requires challenging those laws that are generating harm or that are 
ineffective”. 
 
Given the glacial pace of UN treaty modernisation, we do not think it practical or 
realistic for the UK to wait for such reforms to occur before proceeding with urgently 
needed domestic reform, especially given rapidly evolving precedents in multiple 
jurisdictions across the world. We recommend that the UK follow Uruguay in its 
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principled non-compliance with certain articles of the treaties. They should avoid the 
legally strained ‘flexibility’ arguments being made by the US and instead make a 
clear explanatory statement, acknowledging the non-compliance and offering a clear 
and principled justification rooted in the protection of the health and welfare of UK 
citizens. The UK should also make a public commitment to comply by the other 
articles of the conventions (that the cannabis reforms are not in conflict with), and 
restate its broader commitments to maintaining and respecting international law.   In 
parallel with these moves, we recommend that the UK should encourage and 
meaningfully engage in debate in high level regional and UN forums around reform 
of the global control system to accommodate demands for greater flexibility to 
experiment with regulation models, as well as exploring formal mechanisms such as 
amendment and modification, to modernise the UN drug treaty system. The UK 
should support calls by other member states and civil society groups for the UN to 
convene an independent expert panel to consider the issues raised by 
legalisation/regulation, implications for the existing treaty system, and options for its 
modernisation and reform. 
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